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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
.From: Mark 
v. Quarles, No~Mar. Re: New York 
This is the case in which the pol ice officer captured a 
fleeing suspect, subdued him, discovered an emp~g~, 
and asked him -- prior ~rni~~ where the g~ was. 
I have done some thinking about t hi s Petition, and present the 
following for your consideration. 
As I indicated in my annotation of the pool memo, I think 
the result here is outrageous -- but it also seems to follow log-
ically from the prophylactic rule of Miranda. Onder the prior 
case law, I do not think the dec is ion below is clearly wrong, 
i.e., I do not see any clear basis for a summary reversal. 
That does not mean, of course, that the result must be ac-
cepted. It seems to me there are two possible theories on which 
a contrary result could be reached: 
(1) THERE WAS NO MIRANDA VIOLATION. 
On this view, a police officer who has just captured a flee-
ing person is not required to give Miranda warnings until he is 
certain that his and the public's s ensured. Thus, here 
it was reasonable for the officer to ask about the gun, if not to 
protect himself (the criminal was already handcuffed), then to 
protect bystanders from the danger of a loaded weapon. 
A couple of points may be made about this theory. .First, it 
suggests that the duty to give Miranda warnings may depend on the 
.·' 
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nature of the information sought. If "danger" is the key, then 
the officer may be limited to asking about weapons, as opposed to 
asking about the whereabouts of stolen property. (One might won-
der where abandoned drugs would fit in.) Second, there is some 
problem in suggesting that Miranda need not be followed even 
though there was no imminent danger. Here, it was reasonable for 
the officer to want to find the gun; but it is not clear that 
this desire was so urgent that he could not take a few seconds to 
give the Miranda warnings. (Contrast a situation in which the 
officer subdued this person in a crowded bar, and then found the 
empty holster; the officer reasonably would feel that he remained 
in danger while a weapon was somewhere in the crowd.) Finally, 
what would happen if the suspect refused to answer, and asserted 
his Miranda rights? If the holding is that it is not a Miranda 
violation to ask about the gun, then presumably the officer could 
continue to pressure the suspect for information despite the re-
fusal to speak. 
(2) THERE WAS A MIRANDA VIOLATION, BUT THE EVIDENCE NEED NOT 
BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE NO IMPORTANT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED. 
On this view, the officer should have read the Miranda 
warnings, because the person was in custody and presented no dan-
ger to the officers. The mere fact that the Miranda rule was 
violated, however, does not necessarily require suppression of 
all resulting evidence. This situation differs from the type of 
"self-incrimination" envisioned by the Fifth Amendment. More-
over, there is no doubt as to the reliability of the confession: 





telling the officer the location of the gun might have to be sup-
pressed, ~ gun itself could be used. This analysis has~ 
support in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 478 (1974), where Justice ----Rehnquist inquired as to whether the deterrent purpose of the 
Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule would be served by suppression 
of completely reliable evidence obtained following a technical 
violation of Miranda. 
This view seems more consistent with prior Court reasoning 
than the first view, which simply creates a certain type of "exi-
gent circumstances" exception, and one that is difficult to de-
fine. But it also is a potentially broader theory, as it calls 
into question whether we really should have an inflexible prophy-
lactic rule requiring suppression of all fruits of an interroga-
tion that violates the Miranda rule. 
If either of these theories interests you, then you should 
vote to grant cert. Otherwise, this is a just a fact-bound case 
that applies prior law in a straightforward manner . 
. . 
March 18, 1983, Conference 







Cert to N.Y. Ct. Ap • {Cooke-,
Jones, Fuchsberg, Meyer; 
Wachtler, Jasen, Gabrielli, 
dissenting) {memorandum) 
A f f i r min g N • Y • A pp • D i v • {order ) 
Affirming N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
{Ferraro) qt. ~~ ~ 
State/Criminal J/kz ~e}Y 
1. SUMMARY: After arrest, but before receiving Miranda 
warnings, petr was asked where the gun was. Issues: 1) do 
exigent circumstances justify the questioning of a person in 
custody before he receives his Miranda warnings? 2) must 
.·· 
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always be suppressed? 3) must evidence that would be discovered 
inevitably be suppressed? 
2. THE FACTS: On Sept. 11, 1980, at 12:30 am, police 
officers Kraft and Scarring were approached in their patrol car 
by a young woman who stated that she had been raped at gunpoint. 
She gave the officers a detailed description of the assailant, 
and said that he had gone into an A&P food store on Francis Lewis 
Boulevard. The officers put the woman into the patrol car, 
called for backup units, and drove to the store. As the backup 
units arrived, Kraft stood in the doorway of the store. He saw 
resp, who fit the description, approach the checkout counter. 
When resp noticed Kraft, he turned and ran down the aisle toward 
the back of the store. Kraft gave chase, but lost sight of resp 
as resp turned the corner. When Kraft rounded the corner, he saw 
resp two aisles away and ordered him to stop and put his hands 
over his head. Resp complied, and as the other officers arrived 
guns drawn, Kraft frisked resp finding an empty gun holster. 
With several officers surrounding resp, Kraft reholstered his gun 
and handcuffed resp's hands behind his back. 
Kraft then asked resp where the gun was. Resp answered, 
"the gun is over there," motioning toward a stack of car tons. 
Kraft reached into one carton and withdrew a load revolver. He 
placed resp under arrest and gave him his Miranda warnings. He 
then asked resp if he owned the gun~ resp replied, "yes." When 
Kraft asked where he bought the gun, resp answered, "Miami, 
Florida." No further questioning occurred. 
3. PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Resp was indicted for criminal 
/ 
. .., ... .'"'. .· 
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possession of a weapon in the third d~gree. There is no 
;, 
indication from the papers whether he was ever charg~d with rape. 
The trial court suppressed both his statements and the gun. 
Justice Ferraro held that resp was in custody under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966}, when the question was asked because 
he had been handcuffed. Resp was entitled to Miranda warnings 
before any questioning. He distinguished the stop-and-frisk 
cases because resp was in custody, and he distinguished a police 
safety case, People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14 (1980}, cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1018 (1981} (officer may question person without 
Miranda warning to protect officer's safety}, on the ground that 
"the officers [sic] safety was not in question." App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 4a. The later statements elicited after the Miranda 
warning were tainted by the prior questioning. 
The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. 
4. DECISION BELOW: The Court of Appeals affirmed by a 4 to 
3 vote. Without mentioning federal law explicitly, the majority 
held that, even assuming there is an exigent circumstances 
exception to the pre-warning statement rule, "there is no 
evidence in the record before us that there were exigent 
circumstances posing a risk to the public safety or that the 
police interrogation was prompted by any such concern." Id., at 
7a. The two cases cited by the dissent are inapposite. In 
People v. Huffman, 41 N.Y.2d 29 (1976}, the question "what are 
you doing back here?" was a threshold inquiry seeking general 
information only, not a question calculated to elicit evidence of 
criminal activity such as here. In People v. Chestnut, the 
- ,. -
defendant had not been reduced to physical powerlesspess as here, 
and the officers' question was prompted by a conce ~n for their 
personal safety. 
Justice Wachtler dissented. Miranda and Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980), are concerned with discouraging 
official conduct intended to elicit incriminating responses as 
opposed to conduct designed to achieve legitimate, 
noninvestigatory purposes. The question in People v. Huffman was 
intended to clarify a confusing situation the officers found 
themselves in. In People v. Chestnut, the officer observed the 
defendants, one of whom was believed to be armed, pass a small 
object between themselves prior to their apprehension. With the 
defendants lying on the ground at gunpoint, the one who received 
the object was asked, "where is the gun?" The fact that the 
officer in Chestnut believed himself in physical danger was not 
the basis for the holding. The holding was based on the 
propriety of the question as part of a justifiable stop-and-
frisk. Moreover, the existence of a loaded, lost gun in this 
case posed a danger to the general public. See United States v. 
Castellana, 500 F.2d 325, 326-327 (CAS 1974) (en bane) (officer's 
fear of imminent harm not required). Possibly, resp passed the 
gun to a hidden accomplice or dropped it in the street for a 
child to pick up. Miranda was not intended to thwart official 
attempts to protect public safety. 
5. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends 1) the decision below rests 
solely on the federal Constitution. 2) As in the Fourth 
Amendment context, exigent circumstances justify questioning a 
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person in custody absent Miranda warnings. Severa~ states have 
so extended the exigent circumstances exception. ,·~ere, Kraft 
reasonably believed that there was a gun in the supermarket. To 
require him to give a Miranda warning would subject him and the 
public to unnecessary risks. 3) The Court has never determined 
the extent to which a Miranda violation requires suppression of 
physical evidence obtained derivatively. In Michigan v. Tucker, 
417 u.s. 478 (1964), the Court refused to suppress the testimony 
of a witness who was discovered by use of a statement taken in 
violation of Miranda. The Court also stated that when the 
statement was taken in good faith, the deterrent rationale of the 
exclusionary rule lost much of its force. Id., at 447. Kraft 
acted in good faith here. 4) The doctrine of inevitable 
discovery, recognized by several circuits, prevents exclusion of 
the gun. 
Resp contends 1) the courts below found as a factual matter 
that no exigent circumstances existed. The question asked of 
resp was custodial interrogation as defined in Miranda and in 
Rhode Island v. Innis. The New York Court of Appeals in Chestnut 
has recognized the exception asked for by petr. Petr disputes 
only the factual findings in this case. 2) The gun was tainted 
fruit from the improper interrogation. Michigan v. Tucker 
involved an interrogation that occurred prior to the Miranda 
decision. The Court found that the interrogation was proper 
under the prior rule of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 u.s. 478 
(1964), and that the police had complied with constitutional 
safeguards. ·-Here, resp received no prior warning at all. 3) 
~· . 
- u -
Petr did not present the inevitable discovery doct~ine argument 
in the trial court; under New York law, t~e issue ~~s therefore 
not properly preserved for appellate review. The appellate 
courts did not address the issue. 
6. DISCUSSION: The questioning of resp was a clear Mirand 
violation. Petr asks for an exigent circumstances exception to 
the requirement of Miranda warnings. It appears, however, that 
the New York Court of Appeals recognized precisely such an 
exception in Chestnut. Petr in effect is complaining that Kraft 
really did believe that public safety and his own person were in 
danger. The lower courts expressly rejected this factual claim. 
In United States v. Castellana, FBI agents while executing a 
search warrant led the defendant into a back room where the 
agents believed money was secreted. They expected that the 
defendant would count and verify the money once it was found. 
They had no information that the defendant possessed guns. An 
agent asked the defendant whether he had any weapons within 
reach, and he admitted that there were guns in the desk. The CAS 
held that the question was a security measure justified by Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1 (1968), and that the question did not 
constitute a Miranda interrogation. Castellana does not present 
a conflict. The defendant there, unlike resp here, was not held 
at gunpoint or handcuffed and easily could have reached into the 
desk and jeopardized the officers' safety. 
Michigan v. Tucker, a pre-Miranda case, is inapplicable. 
"'? 
Moreover, it is difficult to see how the officer's question here ~ ~ 
was in good faith. The resp was immobilized, and the officers 
i 
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had control of the area. There was no other purpose for the 
question other than to elicit an incriminating ,·~ admission. 
Finally, although the availability of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine has not been settled by this Court, the New York courts 
did not address the issue, most likely due to the state 
procedural bar. 
7. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
NEW YORK v. BENJAMIN QUARLES 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 
APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
No. 82-1213. Decided May-, 1983 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting from denial of certiorari. 
Shortly after midnight on September 11, 1980, two New 
York police officers were on road patrol in the borough of 
Queens when a young woman approached them and re-
quested assistance. She stated that she had just been raped 
by a man whom she described. She indicated that her assail-
ant had a gun, and that he had gone into a nearby A&P su-
permarket. The ensuing facts, apparently undisputed, are 
chronicled in Judge Wachtler's dissenting opinion in the New 
York Court of Appeals: 
"The officers drove the woman to the supermarket 
where Kraft approached the front of the store on foot 
while Scarring radioed for assistance. Kraft then ob-
served the defendant, who matched the description 
given by the woman, approaching the checkout counter. 
Defendant then fled to the rear of the store with Kraft, 
who lost sight of the defendant for several seconds, in 
pursuit. Kraft told defendant to stop and put his hands 
over his head. Other officers who had arrived in the in-
terim surrounded defendant while Kraft frisked him, 
discovering an empty shoulder holster. 
Kraft handcuffed defendant's hands behind his back 
and asked him where the gun was. The defendant 
looked in the direction of a stack of cartons and re-
sponded "the gun is over there". The gun was not visi-
ble but Kraft reached into one of the cartons and re-
trieved a loaded revolver. He placed defe ant under 
arrest and advised him of his Miranda 'ghts. Kraft 
~'~ v:f~f n:;: 
~~fv ~ 
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then asked defendant if he owned the revolver and re-
ceived an affirmative reply. In response to another 
question posed by Kraft defendant indicated that he pur-
chased the weapon in Miami, Florida." Petn. 9a-10a 
When the state sought to use the gun and the statements 
made by the defendant in criminal proceedings against him, 
the trial court and later the appellate courts of New York 
held that this Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U. S. 436 (1966) required exclusion of the evidence. This re-
sult-all but impossible to justify, I submit, to any thoughtful 
person not schooled in the arcane niceties of 20th century 
American Constitutional law-rests on a plausible but not an 
inevitable reading of our Miranda decision. Being con-
vinced that there is another equally plausible interpretation 
of the Miranda doctrine which would allow the state to use 
this highly relevant evidence, I dissent from this Court's re-
fusal to grant the state's petition for certiorari. 
The Court's decision in Miranda was principally concerned 
with the "inherent compulsions of the interrogation process" 
that were seen to arise when a criminal defendant was "ques-
tioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attor-
ney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world" 
and subjected to deliberate governmental intimidation that 
was "destructive of human dignity." 384 U. 8., at 445, 457, 
467. The Court, however, laid down a series of prophylactic 
rules that would apply even in situations not squarely pre-
senting the evils of coercion and unreliability at which the 
opinion was directed. Thus, the Court held that the 
Miranda safeguards would be applicable to any "interroga-
tion" occurring after "a person has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant 
way." Id., at 444. 
The usefulness of the Miranda rules is two-fold. First, as 
can be attested by anyone who has watched television shows 
in which the police apprehend a suspect, the rules have dis-
couraged application of "third degree" interrogation tech-
niques. In this sense the rules have undoubtedly accom-
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plished one of their major goals. Second, the Miranda 
safeguards have avoided the necessity of individualized in-
quiry as to whether psychological coercion has been used 
against particular defendants. 
In keeping with this latter purpose, decisions rendered by 
this Court in the seventeen years since Miranda was an-
nounced demonstrate a concern that the decision's prophylac-
tic rules be clearcut and easily applied. Thus, in part from 
this desire to maintain a fixed, clear-cut framework of rules, 
we have in several contexts refused to expand the language 
of Miranda, see Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 
(1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564 (1976); 
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707 (1979). Nonetheless, our 
decisions also have evidenced a recognition that additions to 
or subtractions from the general language of Miranda will be 
accepted when other important interests of the criminal jus-
tice system would be jeopardized by a completely wooden 
application of that case. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 
477 (1982), we devised a new prophylactic rule to prevent the 
badgering of an accused who indicates a desire to communi-
cate only through a lawyer. On the other hand, in Harris v. 
New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971) and Oregon v. Haas, 420 
U. S. 714 (1975) the Court held that statements obtained in 
violation of Miranda safeguards can be used to impeach a de-
fendant's testimony on direct examination. Likewise, in 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 (1974), we refused to sup-
press the testimony of a witness discovered as a result of a 
Miranda violation; we concluded that the deterrent value of 
suppression of this testimony simply could not justify the 
costs flowing from exclusion of plainly reliable and highly 
probative evidence, and accordingly, refused to apply 
Miranda in the literal fashion urged by the defendant. 
Viewed against this background, the state's request in this 
case that we consider adopting an "exigent circumstances" 
limitation on the literal sweep of Miranda's language is enti-
tled to careful consideration. If there ever are to be "exi-
gent circumstances" justifying a refusal to exclude evidence 
because of a technical Miranda violation, the circumstances 
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of this case would seem to be as likely a candidate as any. 
Officer Kraft entered the supermarket on foot while his part-
ner radioed for assistance; he immediately observed the de-
fendant, who matched the description given by the rape vic-
tim, approaching the checkout counter. When the defendant 
fled to the rear of the supermarket, Kraft followed in hot pur-
suit with his weapon drawn. Other officers meanwhile ar-
rived and surrounded the defendant while Kraft frisked him, 
discovering an empty shoulder holster. At that point, Kraft 
handcuffed the defendant and asked him where he had put his 
gun. 
To say that in the very process of disarming and handcuff-
ing a fleeing felon an officer must pull out his "Miranda card" 
and recite the familiar warnings written there before asking 
the defendant the natural, almost instinctive question where 
he has hidden his gun-that only a moment ago was in his 
now-empty shoulder holster-would subject the law to well-
deserved ridicule. Exclusionary rules such as that imposed 
by our Miranda decision have been criticized because they 
permit "the criminal to go free because the constable has 
blundered." However one may regard this criticism, surely 
no thinking person can maintain that the "constable" in this 
case "blundered" by asking the single question he did-while 
in the very process of converting the status of the defendant 
from "in flight" to "in custody." Just as the normal require-
ment of Fourth Amendment law is that a warrant be secured, 
the requirement of Miranda is that the warnings be given 
whenever an accused is in custody before "interrogation" oc-
cur. But just as "exigent circumstances" provide an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amend-
ment, "exigent circumstances" should provide a limited 
exception to the application of the Miranda rule in all its 
rigor, at least during the brief moments when an armed, flee-
ing defendant is being reduced to custody. 
The majority of the New York Court of Appeals did not 
rule out the possibility of some such exception, but stated 
that if there were such an exception it would depend on the 
subjective purpose of the police officer asking the question. 
NEW YORK v. QUARLES 
It apparently believed that the exigent circumstances excep-
tion could not be applied absent affirmative testimony that 
the purpose of Kraft's inquiry had been to locate and to con-
fiscate the defendant's gun for the protection of the public, 
rather than to obtain evidence of criminal activity on the part 
of the defendant. Because the trial court had made no find-
ing as to the subjective motivation of the officers, the New 
York Court of Appeals declined to consider the question. 
It would be profitless, it seems to me, to hold that an "exi-
gent circumstances" exception to the Miranda rule depends 
on post hoc findings as to the subjective motivation of par-
ticular police officers. Such a rule would run counter to the 
theme of clear-cut, easily applied rules which has character-
ized our post-Miranda decisions, see p. --, supra. It 
would make little sense to have rules designed to achieve 
generalized deterrent effect, see Michigan v. Tucker, supra, 
417 U. 8., at 447, turn on the question whether an individual 
officer in a particular case experienced one type of mental 
concern rather than another. As JUSTICE WHITE has writ-
ten in a related context, "sending state and federal courts on 
an expedition into the minds of police officers would produce 
a grave and fruitless misallocation of judicial resources." 
Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U. S. 560, 565 (1968) (WHITE, 
J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari as improvi-
dently granted). 
Inquiry into the subjective motivation prompting an officer 
to ask questions of a defendant seems predestined to failure. 
Most police officers placed in the situation occupied by Officer 
Kraft undoubtedly would be concerned in part for their own 
safety, in part for the safety of others, and in part, perhaps, 
with the desirability of obtaining evidence against the ac-
cused. In this case the question "Where is the gun?" no 
doubt flowed instinctively from the nature of the situation 
and the nature of the work, without any very clear motiva-
tion as to why it is asked, and elaborate inquiries into such 
motivation would be as difficult as they would be pointless. 
And even if we were confident that clearcut determinations 
regarding intent were possible, a suppression hearing would 
:, 
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scarcely provide the most likely forum for making such 
findings. 
Ten years ago in United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 
(1973), we held that the "search incident to arrest" exception 
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment should 
not be made to depend on the subjective state of mind of each 
arresting officer, as later determined at a judicial suppression 
hearing. We said, "it is of no moment that [the police offi-
cer] did not indicate any subjective fear of the respond-
ent .... " !d., at 236. Likewise, again in the Fourth 
Amendment context, we have said "[s]ubjective intent alone 
... does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or uncon-
stitutional." Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128, 136 
(1978). For the reasons advanced in Robinson and Scott, as 
well as above, an "exigent circumstances" exception to the 
Miranda rule should not be made to depend upon the exist-
ence of some particular motivation in a particular arresting 
officer. They should instead turn on objective consider-
ations relating to the circumstances in which the officer 
acted. The justification for the narrow "exigent circum-
stances" exception called to mind by the facts of this case is 
that police officers will almost invariably find it necessary to 
apprehend and subdue a defendant before reading him his 
Miranda rights, and, during these brief moments, questions 
of the sort asked here will almost inevitably be put to the sus-
pect. The answers received obviously do not suffer from the 
unreliability that the Miranda rules were designed to pre-
vent, and their suppression is unlikely to have any apprecia-
ble effect on official conduct. Accordingly, I would grant the 
petition for a writ of certiorari. 
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82-1213 New York v. Quarles 
MEMO TO FILE 
An interesting Miranda case that presents a novel 
question, but one of considerable importance to law 
enforcement. Shortly after midnight, a cruising patrol 
car was stoppped by a woman who said she had been raped, 
and that the raper had entered an A&P store. She 
identified him by a teeshirt with "Big Ben" on it in 
yellow letters. After calling for reinforcements, one of 
the officer Kraft identified respondent who fled 
within the store. Officer Kraft caught him, was joined by 
three or four other officers. The New York Courts found 
the facts, critical to this decision, as follows: 
"Police officers surrounded the defendant 
and Officer Kraft ••• frisked him and discovered 
an empty shoulder holster. Kraft then 
handcuffed defendant hands behind his back. 
Kraft then asked the defendant where the gun 
was. The defendant looked in the direction of a 
stack of cartons and said 'the gun is over 
there'. The gun was not in sight but Kraft 
reached into a liquid soap carton and found a 
loaded revolver. He placed defendant under 
arrest and read the proper Miranda warnings to 
him. He then asked the defendant if he owned 






The New York Courts suppressed both the gun and the 
statement that respondent owned it. The rationale of the 
decision below was simple: Respondent was "in custody" 
in the sense that he was not free to leave, and therefore 
the question as to "where is the gun" was custodial 
interrogation. Although defendant had been given Miranda 
warnings before he admitted the gun was his own, this was 
held to be a "fruit" of the custodial questioning. 
The case presents two questions: (i) Whether Kraft's 
question: "Where is the gun?" violated Miranda's 
commands?, and (ii) If so, whether the revolver itself and 
\ the defendant's admission of ownership, elicited after . 
Miranda warnings, were fruits of the initial violation? 
INCIDENT TO ARREST 
The SG argues that questions that clearly are 
"incident to arrest" are not within the rationale of 
Miranda. It is not denied that respondent was in custody 
in the sense that he could not have departed. But was he 
subjected to "custodial interrogation" in the Miranda 
sense? The SG argues rather persuasively that Miranda 
never contemplated this type of situation. Typically, 
custodial interrogation takes place in the station house 




by officers of established techniques of interrogation. 
Even in a situation such Royer (airport seizure) , the 
suspect had been taken to a private room by two officers 
for the purpose of interrogation in a custodial setting 
nor unlike a station house. The SG argues: 
"Arresting a suspect is a discrete process, 
relatively easy to distinguish from subsequent 
efforts to gather testimonial evidence from the 
suspect. When questions are asked as a 
legitimate part of the process of completing an 
arrest, the dangers of coercion with which 
Miranda was concerned ordinarily are not likely 
to be present". (Br. 9, 13) 
The State of New York's brief relies primarily what 
it says are state and lower federal court cases holding . 
that at the time of arrest officers may ask about 
"weapons" where, as here, there was probable cause (after 
the shoulder holster had been found) to believe a weapon 
was near by. The New York courts noted, however, that 
there was no danger here to the officers since he had been 
handcuffed. One answer to this might be that officers had 
a duty to locate a suspected weapon because of danger to 
other people, Here, a fully loaded revolver had been put 
in a carton on a shelf in an A&P store, and could have 
been a real danger. 
4. 
I have not read any of the cases relied upon by the 
State. They are cited on pages 13 - 15 of its blue brief. 
Was the revolver a "fruit" 
The second, less interesting question, is whether the 
revolver discovered after ~M~i~r~a~n~d~a~~warnings, and 
respondent's admission of ownership at that time, properly 
were suppressed by the New York Courts. 
The State and the SG rely on Michigan v. Tucker. The 
SG states that this Court has "not resolved the question 
whether non-testimonial fruits of a Miranda violation may 
be used as evidence." It is argued that the Self-
Incrimination Clause applies only to compelled statements, 
not to non-testimonial evidence. Moreover, both the State 
and the SG rely on the "inevitably discovery" rule. 
Respondent has filed quite an effective brief, 
particularly on the custodial interrogation issue. There 
is a great deal of language in our cases to the effect 
that once a suspect is in custody, Miranda warnings must 
be given. Respondent also distinguishes Michigan v. 
Tucker. 
* * * 
The government argues that questions "incident to 




surrounding a crime", and are not custodial in the sense 
that concerned the Miranda Court. I would like to accept 
this argument, as it makes a great deal of sense. The SG 
argues that the societal costs, in terms of law 
enforcement, are substantial as on the scene questioning 
often contributes to the solution of crimes. In a very 
general sense, this type of questioning is analogous to 
res gesti statements. Here the police officer, in the 
excitement of making an arrest and finding an empty 
shoulder holster, asked the most natural question in the 
world: where is the gun? It simply makes little sense to 
equate this with the custodial interrogation that Miranda 
was concerned about. The difficulty, as the SG 
recognizes, is that a rule with respect to "on the scene" 
questioning would have to be applied on a case by case 
basis. But this is not an unfamiliar situation, 
particularly in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
LFP, JR 
/~ /fT¥- rp-oz;;JC.._ ,_,_ ~ r 
~••«.sQ_ ~ ~ ~ 'z..:f. 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 82-1213 
(Argument Date January 18, 1984) 
Cammie R. Robinson New York v. Quarles January 12, 1984 
Questions Presented 
1. Whether the question "Where is the gun?" by a police 
officer during the course of arrest requires Miranda warnings. 
2. If so, whether the subsequent discovery of the gun 
and the confession by defendant, after being read his Miranda 
rights, that the gun was his are inadmissible as fruits of the 
poison tree, or whether they are admissible because of a good 
faith exception or the rule of inevitable discovery. 
I. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW 
' 'I 
Patrolling police were notified that a man matching 
respondent's description had just committed armed rape. Officer 
Kraft spotted respondent in an A&P and gave chase. He lost sight 
of respondent for 15-20 seconds but soon caught up with him. By 
that time, at least four other officers were on the scene. They 
all surrounded respondent with guns drawn. Respondent 
surrendered with arms above his head and Officer Kraft 
immediately frisked and handcuffed him. The pat down revealed an 
empty shoulder holster, whereupon Officer Kraft asked: "Where is 
the gun?" Respondent pointed to some cartons in the store and 
said: "The gun is over there." The question was asked before 
respondent was read his Miranda rights. The gun was found 
immediately, respondent was read his Miranda rights, and then 
confessed that the gun was his and that he had bought it in 
Miami, Florida. 
Respondent was charged with illegal possession of a 
firearm.l Before trial, he moved to suppress the gun and his 
confession of ownership on the ground that his Miranda rights 
were violated and that the evidence was "fruit of the poison 
tree." The TC found that the question "Where is the gun?" 
constituted "custodial interrogation" requiring Miranda warnings. 
Because these were not given, the TC suppressed the response to 
1Respondent was intially charged with armed rape as well, but 
that charge was dropped. 
the question, gun, and the statement of own~rship. T~e Appellate ., 
Division affirmed without opinion and the Court of Appeals of New 
York affirmed with one judge dissenting. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Rule of Miranda 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966}, this Court 
announced a prophylactic rule to avoid the possibility that 
suspects taken into custody would be coerced into incriminating 
statements in violation of the 5th Amendment. As interpreted and 
applied over the last 17 years, the rule is simple and absolute: 
Once a suspect is taken into custody, police may not interrogate 
him without first providing Miranda warnings. Responses to any 
interrogation conducted without such warnings may not be used in 
the government's case in chief. This rule provides a clearcut 
guideline for police and courts and avoids the necessity of a 
case-by-case inquiry into the existence of coercion. Courts need 
only make two determinations in resolving a Miranda issue: (1} 
Was the suspect in custody? and (2} Was he subject to 
interrogation? A suspect is in custody if he is not free to 
leave. Miranda, 384 u.s., at 4778. Questioning requiring 
Miranda warnings occurs whenever police ask a question that they 
reasonably should expect will elicit an incriminating response. 
See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 u.s. 291, 302 (1980} .2 
Footnote(s} 2 will appear on following pages. 
The State concedes that respondent 'was in "cu~tody" at 
'I 
the time of the challenged quesion. See State's Brief', at 11. 
The SG does not. He attempts to define "custody" differently for 
Miranda purposes than for 4th Amendment purposes: 
It is true that respondent was in custody in the sense 
that he had been seized within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment, but the Fourth Amendment seizure 
should not be equated with "custody" as Miranda uses 
that term. A Fourth Amendment seizure, while a 
necessary condition of requiring Miranda warnings, is 
not a sufficient reason to require warnings. SG's 
Brief, at 5. 
The SG claims that custody "incident to arrest" is not custody 
within the meaning of Miranda because Miranda was concerned with 
custody that was likely to compel suspects to speak and custody 
incident to arrest is not. The SG's definition of "custody" ~ 
not consistent with the everyday use of the term and is vague and 
provi.des little guidance. See, ~, SG's Brief, at 9 ("We do ------
not suggest, of course, that all questions asked at the scene of 
an arrest should be regarded as incident to the arrest."). 
The State argues that although respondent was in 
"custody," the challenged question did not constitute "custodial 
interrogation" within the meaning of Miranda. See State's Brief, 
at 10 (where defendant is "asked a single question, in a public 
place, for the protection of everyone in the vicinity, and this 
2Routine administrative questions necessary to process an 
arrest have been held not to require Miranda warnings. See, 
~, United States ex rel. Hines v. La Vallee, 521 F.2d 1109 
(CA2 1975), cert. denied, 423 u.s. 1090 (1976) ("exception is 
limited to simple indentification information of the most basic 
sort (e.g., name, address, marital status).") . 
. .. 
? 
question led to objective evidence (the gun}" there i~ no 
''I 
"custodial interrogation"}. The State argues that thfs Court 
already has recognized in Innis that not all questions constitute 
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. Citing 446 u.s., at 
302 (questions that are not reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response do not require Miranda warnings}. It 
argues that this Court also should exempt "general on the scene 
questioning" from the rule of Miranda. States Brief, at 10-12. 
It claims support for this exception in Miranda itself. The 
State argues that Miranda distinguished between stationhouse 
questioning and "general on-the-scene questioning as to facts 
surrounding a crime." Miranda, 384 u.s., at 477. Although the 
quoted language is found in Miranda, it is taken entirely out of ~ 
context. The full quote distinguishes between questioning the -suspect in custody and questioning other witnesses: 
When an individual is in custody ••• , the police may, 
of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at 
trial against him. Such investigation may include 
inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-
the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime 
or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-
finding process is not affected by our holding. It is 
an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to 
give whatever information they may have to aid in law 
enforcement. 384 U.S., at 477-478 (emphasis added}. 
The State's attempt to redefine "interrogation" suffers from the 
same problems as the SG's efforts on behalf of the term 
"custody": the definition does not conform with everyday use and 
provides no clear guidance to police. 
The argument of both the State and the SG rest on the 
same premise: Miranda was concerned with the kind of "custodial 
interrogation" that commonly occurs at the stationhouse when the 
suspect is cut off from the outside world, and police ~ay employ 
'\ 
the "third degree" in conducting their interrogation without fear 
of detection. They argue that because the evils that motivated 
Miranda are not present here, there is no need for its 
prophylactic rules. There is some support for this position in 
Miranda. The Court explained the importance of the factual 
background leading to its decision: 
In each [of the four cases] , the defendant was 
questioned by police officers [or some other official] 
in a room in which he was cut off from the outside 
world. They all thus share salient features -
i~communicado interrogation of individuals ip a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating 
statements without full warinings of constitutional 
rights ..•.. An understanding of the nature and setting 
of this in-custody interrogation is essential to our 
decision today. 384 u.s., at 445. 
Nevertheless, subsequent decisions by this Court seem to 
foreclose the argument that stationhouse interrogation of the 
type described in Miranda is the only questioning that requires 
Miranda warnings. In Orozco v. Texas, 394 u.s. 324 (1969), 
Miranda warinings were required even though the suspect was 
questioned immediately on his arrest and in the familiar 
surroundings of his bedroom. The Court expressly rejected the 
argument that stationhouse questioning of the type described in 
Miranda was the only ty~e requirjng Miranda w~ngs. 394 U.S., 
at 327. Orozco virtually forecloses the SG's argument that 
questions "incident to arrest" are not subject to the Miranda 
rule. There police asked the suspect two questions relevant 
here: (1) Do you own a pistol?~ and, (2) Where is the pistol now? 
The answers to both questions were held to be inadmissible under 
Miranda. 
B. Exigency Exception . 'I 
. I 
The State's better argument is based on an exigency 
exception. It claims, quite reasonably, that the question "Where 
is the gun?" under the facts of this case was justified by a 
legitimate concern for the safety of the arresting officers and 
the public. Requiring Miranda warnings regardless of exigent 
circumstances is ridiculous. Assume police get a reliable tip 
that a suspect plans to plant a bomb in the Capitol that is 
scheduled to go off at 2:07 p.m. They apprehend the suspect in 
the building at 2:06 p.m. without the bomb. Police yell at him: 
"Where's the bomb?" He resonds: "It's over there. Let's get out 
of here!" A subsequent judicial determination that the question 
violated Miranda, "would subject the law to well-deserved 
ridicule." New York v. Quarles, No. 82-1213 (JUSTICE REHNQUIST 
dissenting from denial). 
Respondent replies that even if an exigency exception ;.q~f 
is appropriate in theory, it is not appropriate in this case. He ~ 
correctly points out that the state court expressly found that at ~ 
the time of the question respondent posed no threat to officer ~ 
~·~ 
safety and that there was no evidence in the record from which it ~-
could find exigent circumstances posing any risk to public 
safety. Cert. Pet. at 7a. Respondent has a strong argument if 
the exigency exception requires a factual predicate. I do not 
believe that it should. 
The beauty of the Miranda rule is that it is relatively 
simple and absolute. Before announcing its decision, the Court 
looked at all the factors generally applicable to custbdial 
'l 
interrogations and determined, on balance, that a flat 
requirement that Miranda warnings be given before any question is 
asked of a suspect in custody protected the individual's 5th 
Amendment rights without placing too great a burden on society's 
interest in criminal investigation. Once that balance was struck 
in Miranda, there was no need for a case-by-case inquiry into the 
existence of coercion. There was only a two-pronged objective 
test - was the suspect in custody and was he questioned. 
Exceptions to this simple rule that require additional case-by-
case determinations destroy its simplicity and threaten to 
confuse police and the courts. Instead of requiring the police 
to determine the existence of an emergency, it seems better to 
............... ... ' ,____........ 
announce a narrow per se exception: On apprehending a suspect, -.,..._----- -- - '"'"""'--" 
police may inquire immediately into the location of any weapon 
explosive without first giving Miranda warnings. Thus, single 
questions such as "Where is the gun?" or "Where is the bomb?" 
permissible. I agree with the State that these questions are 
necessary to protect the police and the public and are no more 
intrusive than a pat down.3 Because the question challenged her 
fits that narrow exception, I recommend that the Court reverse. 
C. Derivative Evidence and Inevitable Discovery 
3A pat down, of course, does not pose any 5th Amendment 
problems since it does not involve self-incrimination. 
If the Court concludes that the challenged qu~stion 
''l 
violated respondent's Miranda rights, it must determin~ what, if 
any, evidence must be excluded as a result. It is clear that ~-
respondent's response "It's over there" is inadmissible~ It is  
not clear whether the gun, which was discovered as a result of~
that response, or respondent's subsequent confession to 
ownership, which was made after Miranda warnings had been given, 
are inadmissible. The State and the SG advance two theories to 
support their claims that the challenged evidence should be 
admissible despite any Miranda violation: 4 (1) evidence obtained 
derivatively from a good faith violation of Miranda need not be 
excluded; and, (2) evidence that would have been discovered 
"inevitably" need not be excluded. 
(s-~ 'f-tH-J-~U,'~~) 
1. Derivative Evidence - The~~ SG argue that fruits 
(or at least non-testimonial fruits) of a good faith Miranda 
violation should not be subject to the exclusionary rule. This 
Court has not determined whether such derivative evidence must be 
excluded, but language in Miranda suggests that it generally 
should: absent Miranda warnings, "no evidence obtained as a 
result of interrogation can be used against [defendant]." 384 
u.s., at 479. 5 Whatever merit a good faith exception may have in 
4The State argues that both the gun and the confession of 
ownership are admissible regardless of any Miranda violation. 
The SG argues only that the gun is admissible. 
5This is not completely true. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222 (1971), the Court held that statements obtained in violation 
Footnote continued on next page. 
theory, this is not the case to apply it. Under curr~~t law, 
'I 
Miranda warnings must be given before police ask any non-
administrative question of a suspect in custody. Respondent here 
was in custody and was asked a non-administrative question prior 
to Miranda warnings. If the Court is not going to recognize an 
exigency exception, it also should not provide a good faith 
exception to police who violate Miranda's clear dictates 17 years 
after its announcement. 
Both the State and the SG rely on this Court's decision 
in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 u.s. 433 (1974), in urging application 
/'~~ 
of a good faith exception here. I believe that Tucker is ~  
distinguishable. In that case, defendant was arrested for rape 
before Miranda had been decided. The police advised defendant 
that he need not have answer any questions, told him that any 
answers could be used against him, asked him whether he wanted an 
attorney, and inquired as to whether he understood his 
constitutional rights. They did not tell him that he could have 
an attorney appointed if he could not afford one. Defendant 
answered that he understood his rights, that he did not want an 
attorney, and that he was willing to answer questions. He told 
police that at the time of the alleged rape he had been with a 
third party and that he later left and went horne to bed. The 
police contacted the third party whose story did not conform with 
of Miranda may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility if 
he testifies at trial. The Court reasoned that such use of 
evidence would not affect deterrence. 
,. 
defendant's but rather tended to incriminat~ him. Th~ TC 
'1 
excluded that witnesses testimony. This Court reverse~ for 
several reasons: (1) there had been no actual coercion and thus 
no actual 5th Amendment violation~ (2) although there had been a 
technical violation of Miranda because police had not informed 
defendant that he could be appointed counsel, this was 
understandable in view of the fact that Miranda had not yet been 
decided. The Court found the second reason "significant." 417 
u.s., at 447. It does not exist here. It would undercut Miranda 
significantly to hold that 17 years after the decision, 
derivative evidence need not be excluded if there is no actual 
coercion. The whole purpose of Miranda was to avoid the need to t~ 
determine coercion on a case-by-case approach. 6 a 
2. Inevitable Discovery - The State and the SG argue that the gun 
should not be excluded because it inevitably would have been 
discovered on independent evidence. This Court has never 
expressly endorsed the inevitable discovery doctrine, but will --------------------- - ,_ ---
consider the issue in Nix v. Williams, No. 82-1651. It should 
not endorse the doctrine in this case. Once police have 
6There are other distinctions. Most significantly, 
admissiblility of a gun discovered as a direct result of a 
Miranda violation is different from admitting evidence of a 
witness discovered from such a violation. It is not discovery of 
the witness that is the relevant evidence - it is the witness's 
testimony. Where, as in Tucker, neither the police nor the 
defendant controlled the witness's testimony, the link to the 
Miranda violation is attenuated. Not so with discovery of a gun 





committed a Miranda violation, they should have the b~'f den 
demonstrating that evidence found because of that violation 
inevitably would have been discovered by independent evidence. 
There has not even been an attempt to make such a showing here. 7 
III. CONCLUSION 
I recommend that the Court announce a narrow per se rule 
that arresting officers may ask a suspect whom they have just 
taken into custody the whereabouts of any weapons or explosives 
without first giving Miranda warnings. On this narrow rule, it 
should reverse the decision below. Absent this rule, the 
challenged question violated Miranda, and both the response to 
the question and all evidence discovered because of it should be 
excluded. This case does not present a good situation to apply 
the good faith exception or the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
ADDENDUM 
The State cites cases that generally indicated that many 
states have applied the kind of exception to Miranda urged here. 
The strongest of these are: 
7Respondent also argues that the issue is foreclosed by the 
state's preclusion rule. It was not raised at the hearing 
suppression and under state law it may not be raised on appeal. 
Because I believe that the State has not even attempted to meet 
its burden of proof on this issue, I have not investigated this 
issue. 
(1) State v. Lane, 467 P.2d 304 (Wash. 1970) - Defendants 
'I 
robbed a grocery store at gunpoint. A few days later, police 
"crashed" defendants apartment and found them there. One officer 
interrupted another's recitation of Miranda to ask: "Do you have 
the gun?" This elicited an incriminating response. Held: 
Defendant was in custody at the time of the question, but there 
was no Miranda violation because the question was motivated by 
safety concerns. The court cited the case of State v. Hayes, 439 
P.2d 978 (1968), where a defendant had been arrested, handcuffed, 
and was being led to the paddywagon when he pulled a gun and 
fired at the officer. 
(2) People v. Mullins, 532 P.2d 733 (Colorado 1975) - Police 
arrived to find defendant standing over a man who had just been 
shot. There was another person present. Before giving Miranda 
warnings, they asked "Where is the gun?" This elicited an 
incriminating response. Held: No Miranda violation because the 
question was motivated by safety concerns. "The actions of the 
----~--------------police in attempting to locate the weapon, in order to protect 
themselves and the public, was entirely reasonable." Id., at 
735. 
(3) Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1971) - Police 
arrested defendant minutes after a shooting. As the officer was 
conducting a pat down, he asked defendant if he had a gun. 
Defendant responded that he did and that it was in the car. 
Held: No Miranda violation because the question was prompted by 
legitimate safety concerns. 
' (4) Ballew v. State, 441 S.W.2d 453 (Ark. 1969) - r~Pol ice 
'I 
apprehended defendants as the were running from a shot'gun 
killing. As defendants approached police with hands raised, 
police asked: "Where is the shotgun?" This elicited an 
incriminating response. Held: No Miranda violation because the 
question was motivated by safety concerns. 
(5) State v. Levy, 292 So.2d 220 (La. 1974) - Defendant shot 
her husband in a bar and then went out to the parking lot and sat --------in her car until police arrived. An officer approached the car 
and asked: "Is that your husband in" there?" She responded that 
it was and that she had shot him. The officer then told her to 
get out and asked "Where is the gun?" Held: No Miranda violation 
because the question was motivated by safety concerns. 
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From: Justice Rehnquist 
~- ·f r -r 7;?,.,a4 
Recirculated: _ _______ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~ ~ • . 82-1213 
NEW YORK v. BENJAMIN QUARLES 
1 ~ ~ .. ~ ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
~~~ OFNEWYORK 
[February - , 1984] - j;.b)~ ,£,v JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
{,1/V Respondent Benjamin Quarles was charged in the New 
_pff~ ... York trial court with criminal possession of a weapon. The 
trial court suppressed the gun in question, and a statement 
made by respondent, because the statement was obtained by 
_ '3 police before they read respondent his "Miranda rights." 
, . That ruling was affirmed on appeal through the New York 
~ .I 1 ~ Court of Appeals. We granted certiorari, -- U. S. --
rll"~ .J~;' }rtt- 103 S. Ct. 2118 (1983) , and we now reverse. We conclud' 
~ that under the circumstances involved in this case, overriding 
~ •• / considerations of public safety justify the officer's failure to 
~~~ · 1 provide Miranda warnings before he asked questions de-
voted to locating the abandoned weapon. 
On September 11, 1980, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Offi-
cer Frank Kraft and Officer Sal Scarring were on road patrol 
/in Queens, New York, when a young woman approached 
. . _ .C~ t:( - ~ their car. She told them that she had just been raped by a 
~ black male, approximately six feet tall, who was wearing a . ) : ~ r- }J 
1
,<j black jacket with the name "Big Ben" printed in yellow let-
LMA,..~ ters on the back. She told the officers that the man had just 
lAJ-A~ ~ r entered an A~ P supermarket located nearby and that the 
,. ~.......-.. -, ll ... ~n was carrying a gun . 
.A ~~ .Y The officers drove the woman to the supermarket, and Of-
, I ficer Kraft entered the store while Officer Scarring radioed 
/) -~ .6 w-rvJ.. for assistance. Officer Kraft quickly spotted respondent, 
~ ,, who matched the woman's description, approaching a check-
,1 - 1 - . -
J JU-~ l+-kcS r ~n ~ ~Ltt~rr-~ er bl ~ - -# ~ 
~ LA ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ p-J-u.<Lb 0.....0 ~ tru5{J-
~ ~ (~ ?f l.o-~ _j e.1 --1:~~c_;f~ ~ 1/~ 
a_;f ~f~u_ kJ ~t1~1~~¥o -1-tu_ ~QAQ~ 
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out counter. Apparently upon seeing the officer, respondent 
turned and ran toward the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft 
pursued him with a drawn gun. When respondent turned 
the corner at the end of an aisle, Officer Kraft lost sight of 
him for approximately 15-20 seconds, and upon regaining 
sight of respondent, ordered him to stop and put his hands 
over his head. 
Although more than three other officers had arrived on the 
scene by that time, Officer Kraft was the first to reach re-
spondent. He frisked him and discovered that he was wear-
ing a shoulder holster which was then empty. After hand-
cuffing him, Officer Kraft asked him where the gun was. 
Respondent nodded in the direction of some empty cartons 
and responded, "the gun is over there." Officer Kraft there-
after retrieved a loaded .38 caliber revolver from one of the 
cartons, formally placed respondent under arrest, and read 
him his Miranda rights from a printed card. Respondent in-
dicated that he would be willing to answer questions without 
an attorney present. Officer Kraft then asked respondent if 
he owned the gun and where he had purchased it. Respond-
ent answered that he did own it and that he had purchased it 
in Miami, Florida. 
In the subsequent prosecution of respondent for criminal 
possession of a weapon, 1 the judge excluded the statement, 
"the gun is over there," and the gun because the officer had 
not given respondent the warnings required by our decision 
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), before asking 
him where the gun was located. The judge excluded the 
other statements about respondent's ownership of the gun 
and the place of purchase, as evidence tainted by the prior 
Miranda violation. The Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of New York affirmed without opinion. 44 7 N. Y. S. 
2d 84 (1981). 
1 The state originally charged respondent with rape, but the record pro-
vides no information as to why the state failed to pursue that charge. 
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The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed 
by a 4-3 vote. 58 N. Y. 2d 664, 444 N. E. 2d 984 (1982). It 
concluded that respondent was in "custody" within the mean-
ing of Miranda during all questioning and rejected the state's 
argument that the exigencies of the situation justified Officer 
Kraft's failure to read respondent his Miranda rights until 
after he had located the gun. The court declined to recog-
nize an exigency exception to The usual requiremei)tS of 
!J tranda because it" found no indication from Office ' 
testimony at the suppression hearing that his ubjective 
motivation in as · g_the_ question was to protect 1s~_own 
safety or the safety of the public. 58 N. Y. 2d, at 666, 444 
. E. 2 , a 5. or the reasons which follow, we believe 
that (his caWpresents a situation where concern for public 
safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal lan-
glligeor tfie proPJiYlaCtic rules enunciated in Miranda.? ~~=--­
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person . . . 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself." U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. In Miranda this Court 
n.~P. for the first time extended the Fifth Amendment privilege 
~ against compulsory self-incrimination to individuals sub-
~ l . ~ected to custodial interrogation by the police. 384 U. S., at 
IJt)> ivA ~.r·. 460-461, 467:-Tiie Fifth Amendment itself does not prohibit 
~ 2 We have long recognized an exigent circumstances exception to the 
warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment context. See, e. g., 
Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 509 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 
294, 298--300 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15 (1948). 
We have found the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment inap-
plicable in cases where the " 'exigencies of the situation' make the needs of 
law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 
385, 394 (1978), quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 456 
(1948). Although "the Fifth Amendment's strictures, unlike the Fourth's, 
are not removed by showing reasonableness,'.' Fisher v. United States, 425 
U. S. 391, 400 (1976), we conclude today that there are limited circum-
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all incriminating admissions; "[a]bsent some officially coerced 
self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not vio-
lated by even the most damning admissions." United States 
v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187 (1977) (emphasis added). 
The Miranda Court, however, presumed that interrogation 
in certain custodial circumstances 3 is inherently coercive and 
held that statements made under those circumstances are in-
admissible unless the suspect is specifically informed of his 
Miranda rights and freely decides to forego those rights. 
The prophylactic ~~ings therefore are "not them-
selves rights protected by t1ie (j'Qnstitution but [are] instead 
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-in-
crimination [is] protected." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 
433, 444 (1974); see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 492 
(1981) (POWELL, J., concurring). Requiring Miranda 
warnings before custodial interrogation provides "practical 
reinforcement" for the Fifth Amendment right. Michigan 
v. Tucker, supra, at 444. 
In this case we have before us no ~1!1-im that respondent's 
statements were actually 'com elled by polfc,e conduct which 
overcame 1s WI to resist. See Beckwith v. United States, 
425 U. S. 341, 347-348 (1976); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 
U. S. 738 (1966). Thus the only issue before us is whether 
Officer Kraft was justified in failing to make available to re-
/ spondent the procedural gfegJiards associated with the privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination since Miranda. 
The New York Court of Appeals was undoubtedly corr~t ~ 
in deciding that the facts of this case come within the ambit of 
the Miranda decision as we have subsequently interpreted it. 
3 Miranda on its facts applies to station house questioning, but we have 
not so limited it in our subsequent cases, often over strong dissent. See, 
e. g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U. S. 291 (1980) (police car); Orozco v. 
Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969) (defendant's bedroom); Mathis v. United 
States, 391 U. S. 1 (1968) (prison cell during defendant's sentence for an 
unrelated offense); but see Orozco v. Texas, supra, at 32S-331 (WHITE, J., 
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We agree that respondent was in police custod{because we 
have noted that "the ultimate'inquiry is simply whether there 
is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of 
the degree associated with a formal arrest," California v. 
Beheler,-- U.S.--,-- (1983) (per curiam), quoting 
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). 
Here Quarles was surrounded by at least four police officers 
and was handcuffed when the questioning at issue took place. 
[
As the New York Court of Appeals observed, there was 
nothing to suggest that any of the officers were any longer 
concerned for their own physical safety. 58 N. Y.2d, at 666, 
444 N. E. 2d, at 985. The New York Court of Appeals' ma-
jority declined to express an opinion as to whether there 
might be an exception to the Miranda rule if the police had 
been acting to protect the public, because the lower courts in 
New York had made no factual determination that the police 
had acted with that motive. Ibid. 
We hold that on these facts there is a "public safety" excep-
tion to the requirement that Miranda warnmgs""be gweno e-
:rofe a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and 
that the availability of that exception does not de end' upon 
~e motivation o t ·n 1 liiY""oiveii. In ~7 
lei oscop1c situation such as t e one co onting these offi- ' 
~here ' pontw ew rather than adherence to a police 
manual is necessan y e order of the day, the application of 
the exception which we recognize today should not be made 
to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing con-
cerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer. 4 
'Similar approaches have been rejected in other contexts. See Rhode 
Island v. Innis, supra, at 301 (officer's subjective intent to incriminate not 
determinative of whether "interrogation" occurred); United States v. Men· 
denhall, 446 U. S. 544, 554 & n. 6 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (officer's 
subjective intent to detain not determinative of whether a "seizure" oc-
curred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 236 & n. 7 (1973) (officer's subjective fear not de-
terminative of necessity for "search incident to arrest" exception to the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement). 
i, 
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Undoubtedly most police officers, if placed in Officer Kraft's ...,-
position, would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and I ~ 
lar~ly unverifiable motives-their own safetY, the safetym 
others, and pertiapsas well the desire to obtain incrimmating 
ev1aence from the suspect. 
Whatever the motivation of individual officers in such a 
A ~ 'J , vutd-" situation, we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings 
s 0 ~J ? of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situa- ~ 
futAA +k~ ~ tion in which police officers ask questions easonably 
~~ t..J:l ~prompted by a concern for the public safety. e Miranda 
-/-~ ~ decision was based in large part on this Court's view that the 
~ ~L 1... . ~ warnings which it required police to give to suspects in cus-
. rCA ~ · tody WOUld reduce the likelihood that the SUSpects WOUld fall 
~ Gt. ~ victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police in-
+~ terrogation in the presumptively coercive environment of the 
· station house. 384 U. S. , at 455-458. The dissenters 
warned that the requirement of Miranda warnings would 
have the effect of decreasing the number of sus ect 
spond to police questionin d., at 504, 516-517 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). The Miranda majority, however, apparently 
felt that whatever the cost to society in terms of fewer con-
victions of guilty suspects, that cost would simply have to be 
borne in the interest of enlarged protection for the Fifth 
Amendment privilege. 
The police in this case, in the very act of apgrehen_illng a 
~~ct, were confronted with the immediate neceSsitYoTaS-
certaining the wflereabo~ts _2.[ ~which theytuldevery 
reason t6 believe rii'e"suS'j)eCthid just removed from his 
empty holster and discarded in the supermarket. So long as 
the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with 
its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more 
than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might 
make use of it, a customer or employee might later come 
upon it. 
In such a situation, if the police are required to recite the 
familiar Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts of 
82-1213-0PINION 
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the gun, suspects in Quarles' position might well be deterred 
from responding. Procedural safeguards which deter a sus-
pect from responding were deemed acceptable in Miranda in 
order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the 
primary social cost of those added protections is the possibil-
ity of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority was willing to 
bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings deterred 
Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft's question about the 
whereabo-q.ts of the gun, the cost would have been something 
more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in con: AJ "AJA. A---
victing Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his ques-J ~ r,v "-- ....... 
tion not simply to make his case against Quarles but to insure ~} k tM-u...j_t._ 
that further danger to the public did not result from the con- c._,.J-. -~ ~
cealment of t lie'-gun ih a pubhc a rea. ~ +tu_ ~ 
C :\ We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a I ~?'-~ 
E ~ck.J-~f----t---.Situatwn posmg iahreat to the public safety outweighs the 
1 need for the prop~ylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amend-
LJ .S.V~ }t...o-.f-~ ment's privilege against self-incrimination. We decline to 
~'1 ~ ~ place officers such as Officer Kraft in the untenable position 
I " of having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it 
~~} o - best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions 
~ without the Miranda warnings and render whatever proba-
tive evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give 
the warnings in order to preserve the admissibilty of evi-
dence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy 
their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the vola-
tile situation confronlJt"~~~~-
In recognizing a narro exc~pti to the Miranda rule i~l ~ 
this ease9, we ackno t o some degree we lessen the , ~'? 
desirable clarity of that rule. At least in part in order to ure ~A p~ I 
preserve its clarity, we have over the years refused to sane- O-M. ~ (L,_~ 
tion attempts to expand our Miranda holding. See, e. g., ~ u _ _ ._ ~ · 
Minnesota v. Murphy,-- U. S. -- (1984) (refusal to ex- 'V'V'-#-CA.T 1o 
tend Miranda requirements to interviews with probation of- ~"-c... ~c.....M.) 
ficers); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707 (1979) (refusal to 
equate request to see a probation officer with request to see a 
82-1213-0PINION 
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lawyer for Miranda purposes); Beckwith v. United States, 
425 U. S. 341 (1976) (refusal to extend Miranda require-
ments to questioning in non-custodial circumstances). As 
we have in other contexts, we recognize here the importance 
of a workable rule "to guide police officers, who have only 
limited time aiid expertise to reflect on and balance the social 
and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances 
they confront." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 
213-214 (1979). But as we have pointed out, we believe that 
the exception which we recognize today lessens the necessity 
of that on-the-scene balancing process. The exception will 
not be difficult for police officers to apply because in each case 
it will be circumscribed by the exigency which justifies it. 
We think police officers can and will distinguish almost in-
stinctive! between ue · ons necessary to secure their own 
safe y or the.Jafetjr ~t e py,blic an questions designed 
sol ely to eHCit testimoniaiev'tience i'rom a suspect. 
The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that distinction 
and an officer's ability to recognize it. Officer Kraft asked 
only the question necessary to locate the missing gun before 
advising respondent of his rights. It was only after securing 
the loaded revolver and giving the warnings that he contin-
ued with investigatory questions about the ownership and 
place of purchase of the gun. The M ceptiog which we recog-
nize today, far from complicating e thought processes and 
the on-the-scene judgments of police officers, will simply free 
them to follow their legitimate instincts when confronting 
situations presenting a danger to The public safety. 5 
6 Although it involves police questions in part relating to the where-
abouts of a gun, Orozco v. Texas, supra, is in no sense inconsistent with 
our disposition of this case. In Orozco four hours after a murder had been 
committed at a restaurant, four police officers entered the defendant's 
boardinghouse and awakened the defendant, who was sleeping in his bed-
room. Without giving him Miranda warnings, they began vigorously to 
interrogate him about whether he had been present at the scene of the 
shooting and whether he owned a gun. The defendant eventually admit-
ted that he had been present at the scene and directed the officers to a 
82-121~PINION 
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We hold that the Court of Appeals in this case erred in ex-
cluding the statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun 
because of the officer's failure to read respondent his 
Miranda rights before attempting to locate the weapon. Ac-
cordingly we hold that it also erred in excluding the subse-
quent statements as illegal fruits of a Miranda violation. 6 
We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
washing machine in the backroom of the boardinghouse where he had hid-
den the gun. We held that all the statements should have been sup-
pressed. In Orozco, however, the questions about the gun were clearly 
investigatory; they did not in any way relate to an objectively reasonable 
need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associ-
ated with the weapon. In short there was no exigency requiring immedi-
ate action by the officers beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a 
serious crime. 
6 Because we hold that there is no violation of Miranda in this case, we 
have no occasion to reach arguments made by the state and the United 
States as amicus curiae that the gun is admissible either because it is non-
testimonial or because the police would inevitably have discovered it ab-
sent their questioning. 
.ilUFmu Cl+ouri gf tlp~Ub .iltaU• 
••.lfbtfhtn. '· <lf. 20~,., 
CHAMI!li!:RII 01" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
February 17, 1983 
Re: 82-1213 - New York v. Quarles 
Dear Bill: 
Because I took a somewhat different view at 
Conference, I will wait for other writing. 
Justice Rehnquist 
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cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
,jn.prtm:t <ijDttrt ttf tqt 1tnittb ,jtaft,e' 
,rultlttgt.on, ~. <II· 21l~J1.~ 
February 21, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1213 New York v. Quarles 
Dear Bill, 
As you know, I expressed a different view at 
Conference on this case. I continue to believe that 
if we are to adhere to Miranda, a clear, bright line 
will serve us better than a blurring of the rule for 
a "public safety" exception. What I believe is more 
important in the case is to determine that failure to 
properly administer Miranda warnings is not in itself 
justification for suppression of the nontestimonial 
fruits, i.e., the gun. 
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THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
'1 
February 22, 1984 
PERSONAL 
Re: 82-1213 - New York v. Quarles 
Dear Bill: 
( 1) I agree. 
(2) You note that respondent in this case was "in 
police custody." However, it is unclear from the opinion 
whether you believe respondent was subject to Miranda 
"interrogation." In my view, the spontaneous and 
prophylactic inquiry "where is the gun" is not traditional 
police "interrogation" proscribed by Miranda. However, I 
realize that there may not . be a Court for such a holding. 
I also realize that if there was a Court for the position, 
we would have no need to reach the exception you have 
fashioned here. In light of these latter factors, I will, 
of course, join the opinion. 
An officer confronted with a situation like this 
one will inevitably--or surely should--take into account 
the risk of injury from a weapon, or in an extreme case, a 
bomb or other dangerous instrumentality. "Where is it" is 
an appropriate, if not indispensable prophylactic step, 
and the law should encourage him to do so: at least not 
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Join me, please. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
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Dear Bi 11: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
cc - to the Conference 
LFP/vde 
CHAMBERS OF' 
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April 26, 1984 
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Dear Thurgood: 
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7' 4th DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-1213 
NEW YORK v. BENJAMIN QUARLES 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF NEW YORK 
[May-, 1984] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in part in the judgment 
and dissenting in part. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the Court 
held unconstitutional, because inherently compelled, the ad-
mission of statements derived from in-custody questioning 
not preceded by an explanation of the privilege against self-
incrimination and the consequences of foregoing it. Today, 
the Court concludes that overriding considerations of public 
safety justify the admission of evidence-oral statements and 
a gun-secured without the benefit of such warnings. Ante, 
at 7. In so holding, the Court acknowledges that it is de-
parting from prior precedent, see id., at 4, and that it is 
"lessen[ing] the desirable clarity of [the Miranda] rule, id., 
at 7. Were the Court writing from a clean slate, I could 
agree with its holding. But Miranda is now the law and, in 
my view, the Court has not provided sufficient justification 
for departing from it or for blurring its now clear strictures. 
Accordingly, I would require suppression of the initial state-
ment taken from respondent in this case. On the other 
hand, nothing in Miranda or the privilege itself requires ex-
clusion of nontestimonial evidence derived from informal cus-
todial interrogation, and I tlierefore agree with the Court 
that admission of the gun in evidence is proper. 1 
1 As to the statements elicited after the Miranda warnings were admin-
istered, admission should turn solely on whether the answers received 
\ 
82-1213---CONCUR/DISSENT 
2 NEW YORK v. QUARLES 
I 
Prior to Miranda, the privilege against self-incrimination 
had not been applied to an accused's statements secured dur-
ing custodial police interrogation. In these circumstances, 
the issue of admissibility turned, not on whether the accused 
had waived his privilege against self-incrimination, but on 
whether his statements were "voluntary" within the meaning 
ofthe Due Process Clause. See, e. g., Haynes v. Washing-
ton, 373 U. S. 503 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 
(1958); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940); Brown v. 
Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936). Under this approach, the 
"totality of the circumstances" were assessed. If the in-
terrogation was deemed unreasonable or shocking, or if the 
accused clearly did not have an opportunity to make a ra-
tional or intelligent choice, the statements received would be 
inadmissible. 
The Miranda Court for the first time made the Self-In-
crimination Clause applicable to responses induced by infor-
mal custodial police interrogation, thereby requiring sup-
pression of many admissions that, under traditional Due 
Process principles, would have been admissible. More spe-
cifically, the Court held that: 
"the prosecution may not use statements, whether excul-
patory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interro-
were voluntary. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 475 (1966). In 
this case, the state courts made no express finding concerning the volun-
tariness of the statements made, because they thought the answers re-
ceived had to be suppressed as "fruit" of the initial failure to administer 
Miranda warnings. App. 43a-44a, 52a. Whether the mere failure to ad-
minister Miranda warnings can "taint" subsequent admissions is an open 
question, compare United States v. Toral, 536 F. 2d 893, 896-897 (CA9 
1976) with Oregon v. Elstad, 61 Ore. App. 673, 658 P. 2d 552 (1983), cert. 
granted,- U. S.- (1984), but a proper inquiry must focus at least 
initially, if not exclusively, on whether the subsequent confession is itself 
free of actual coercion. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596, 603 
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gation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege 
against self-incrimination." Miranda v. Arizona, 
supra, 384 U. S., at 444. 
Those safeguards included the now familiar Miranda warn-
ings-namely, that the defendant must be informed: 
"that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he 
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he 
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if 
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for 
him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Id., at 
479. 
The defendant could waive these rights, but any waiver had 
to be made "knowingly and intelligently," id., at 475, and the 
burden was placed on the prosecution to prove that such a 
waiver had voluntarily been made. Ibid. If the Miranda 
warnings were not properly administered or if no valid 
waiver could be shown, then all responses to interrogation 
made by the accused "while in custody . . . or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way" were to 
be presumed coerced and excluded from evidence at trial. 
Id., at 476, 479. 
The Miranda Court itself considered objections akin to 
those raised by the Court today. In dissent, JusTICE 
WHITE protested that the Miranda rules would "operate in-
discriminately in all criminal cases, regardless of the severity 
of the crime or the circumstances involved." I d., at 544. 
But the Miranda Court would not accept any suggestion 
"that society's need for interrogation [could] outweig[h] the 
privilege." To that Court, the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation was absolute and therefore could not be "abridged." 
Id., at 479. 
Since the time Miranda was decided, the Court has repeat-
edly refused to bend the literal terms of that decision. To be 
sure, the Court has been sensitive to the substantial burden 
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the Miranda rules place on local law enforcement efforts, and 
consequently has refused to extend the decision or to in-
crease its strictures on law enforcement agencies in almost 
any way. See, e. g., California v. Beheler,-- U. S. --
(1983) (per curiam); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492 
(1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U. S. 341 (1976); 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U. S. 96 (1975); but cf. Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981). Similarly, where "state-
ments taken in violation of the Miranda principles [have] not 
be[en] used to prove the prosecution's case at trial," the 
Court has allowed evidence derived from those statements to 
be admitted. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 445 (1974). 
But wherever an accused has been taken into "custody" and 
subjected to "interrogation'.' without warnings, the Court has 
consistently prohibited the use of his responses for prosecuto-
rial purposes at trial. See, e. g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U. S. I 
454 (1981); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. 
United States, 391 U. S. 1 (1968); cf. Harris v. New York, 
401 U. S. 222 (1971) (statements may be used for impeach-
ment purposes). As a consequence, the "meaning of 
Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement 
practices have adjusted to its strictures." Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U. S. 291, 304 (1980) (THE CHIEF JusTICE, con-
curring); see generally Stephens, Flanders, and Cannon, 
Law Enforcement and the Supreme Court: Police Percep-
tions of the Miranda Requirements, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 407 
(1972). 
In my viE:!W, a "public safety" exception unnecessarily blurs 
the edges of the clear line heretofore established and makes 
Miranda's requirements more difficult to understand. In 
some cases, police will benefit because a reviewing court will 
find that an exigency excused their failure to administer the 
required warnings. But in other cases, police will suffer be-
cause, though they thought an exigency excused their non-
compliance, a reviewing court will view the "objective" cir-
cumstances differently and require exclusion of admissions 
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thereby obtained. The end result will be a finespun new 
doctrine on public safety exigencies incident to custodial in-
terrogation, complete with the hair-splitting distinctions that 
currently plague our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
"While the rigidity of the prophylactic rules was a principal 
weakness in the views of the dissenters and critics outside 
the Court, ... that rigidity [has also been called a] strength 
of the decision. It [has] afforded police and courts clear 
guidance on the manner in which to conduct a custodial in-
terrogation; if it was rigid, it was also precise .... [T]his core 
virtue of Miranda would be eviscerated if the prophylactic 
rules were freely [ignored] by ... courts under the guise" of 
[reinterpreting] Miranda ..... " Fare v. Michael C., 439 
U. S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers on 
application for stay). 
The justification the Court provides for upsetting the equi-
librium that has finally been achieved-that police cannot and 
should not balance considerations of public safety against the 
individual's interest in avoiding compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination-really misses the critical question to be de-
cided. See ante, at 7-8. Miranda has never been read to 
prohibit the police from asking questions to secure the public 
safety. Rather, the critical question Miranda addresses is 
who shall bear the cost of securing the public safety when 
such questions are asked and answered: the defendant or the 
State. Miranda, for better or worse, found the resolution of 
that question implicit in the prohibition against compulsory 
self-incrimination and placed the burden on the State. When 
police ask custodial questions without administering the re-
quired warnings, Miranda quite clearly requires that the an-
swers received be presumed compelled and that they be ex-
cluded from evidence at trial. See Michigan v. Tucker, 
supra, at 445, 447-448, 451, 452 and n. 26; Orozco v. Texas, 
supra, at 326. 
The Court concedes, as it must, both that respondent was 
in "custody" and subject to "interrogation" and that his state-
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ment "the gun is over there" was compelled within the mean-
ing of our precedent. See ante, at 4-5. In my view, since 
there is nothing about an exigency that makes custodial in-
terrogation any less compelling, a principled application of 
Miranda requires that respondent's statement be sup-
pressed. 
II 
The court below assumed, without discussion, that the 
privilege against self-incrimination required that the gun de-
rived from respondent's statement also be suppressed, 
whether or not the State could independently link it to him. 2 
That conclusion was, in my view, incorrect. 
A 
Citizens in our society have a deeply rooted social obliga- J ~ 
tion "to give whatever information they may have to aid in 
2 Respondent contends that the separate admissibility of the gun is not 
preserved for our review. Brief for Respondent 45--51. This contention 
is meritless. Respondent's motion to suppress and supporting affidavit 
asked that the gun be excluded because it was obtained in contravention of 
his privilege under the Fifth Amendment. See App. 5a, 7a-8a. The State 
clearly opposed this motion, contending that admission of the statements 
and the gun would not violate respondent's rights under the Constitution. 
Id., at 9a. Both the Supreme Court of the State of New York and the 
New York Court of Appeals required the gun, as well as the statements, to 
be suppressed because respondent was not given the warnings to which 
they thought he was constitutionally entitled. Id., at 43a (Supreme 
Court); id., at 52a (Court of Appeals). The issue whether the failure to 
administer warnings by itself constitutionally requires exclusion of the gun 
was therefore clearly contested, passed on, and preserved for this Court's 
review. See Illinois v. Gates,-- U.S.--,----- (1983). 
Respondent also contends that, under New York law, there is an "inde-
pendent and adequate state ground" on which the Court of Appeals' judg-
ment can rest. Brief for Respondent 51-55. This may be true, but it is 
also irrelevant. Both the trial and appellate courts of New York relied on 
Miranda to justify exclusion of the gun; they did not cite or expressly rely 
on any independent state ground in their published decisions. In these 
circumstances, this Court has jurisdiction. See Michigan v. Long, --
U. S. -, - (1983). 
~~ 
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law enforcement." Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 478. 
Except where a recognized exception applies, "the criminal 
defendant no less than any other citizen is obliged to assist 
the authorities." Roberts v. United States, 445 U. S. 552, 
558 (1980). The privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion is one recognized exception, but it is an exception none-
theless. Only the introduction of a defendant's own testi-
mony is proscribed by the Fifth Amendment's mandate that 
no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself." U. S. Const., Arndt. 5. That man-
date does not protect an accused from being compelled to sur-
render nontestimonial evidence against himself. See Fisher 
v. United States, 425 U. S. 391, 408 (1976). 
The distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial ev-
idence was explored in some detail in Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, a decision this Court handed down within a week of de-
ciding Miranda. See 384 U. S. 757 (1966). The defendant 
in Schmerber had argued that the privilege against self-in-
crimination barred the state from coll}pelling him to submit 
to a blood test, the results of which would be used to prove 
his guilt at trial. The State, on the oth~r hand, had urged 
that the privilege prohibited it only from compelling the ac-
cused to make a formal testimonial statement against himself 
in an official legal proceeding. This Court rejected both po-
sitions. It favored an approach that protected the "accused 
only from being compelled to testify against himself, or oth-
erwise provide the state with evidence of a testimonial or 
communicative nature." ld., at 761. The blood tests were 
admissible because they were neither testimonial nor commu-
nicative in nature. ld., at 765. 
In subsequent decisions, the Court relied on Schmerber in 
holding the privilege inapplicable to situations where the ac-
cused was compelled to stand in a lineup and utter words that 
allegedly had been spoken by the robber, see United States 
v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218, 221-223 (1967), to provide handwrit-
ing samples, see Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263, 26&-266 
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(1967), and to supply voice exemplars. See United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 5-7 (1973); see also United States v. 
Mara, 410 U. S. 19, 21-22 (1973). "The distinction which 
... emerged [in these cases], often expressed in different 
ways, [was] that the privilege is a bar against compelling 
'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which 
makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evi-
dence' does not violate it." Schmerber v. California, supra, 
at 764. 
B 
The gun respondent was compelled to supply is clearly evi-
dence of the "real or physical" sort. What makes the ques-
tion of its admissibility difficult is the fact that, in asking re-
spondent to produce the gun, the police also "compelled" him, 
in the Miranda sense, to create an incriminating testimonial 
response. In other words, the case is problematic because 
police compelled respondent not only to provide the gun but 
also to admit that he knew where it was and that it was his. 
It is settled that Miranda did not itself determine whether 
physical evidence obtained in this manner would be admissi-
ble. See Michigan v. Tucker, supra, 417 U. S., at 445-446, 
447, 452 and n. 26. But the Court in Schmerber, with 
Miranda fresh on its mind, did address the issue. In con-
cluding that the privilege did not require suppression of com-
pelled blood tests, the Court noted: 
"This conclusion would not necessarily govern had the 
State tried to show that the accused had incriminated 
himself when told that he would have to be tested. 
Such incriminating evidence may be an unavoidable by-
product of the compulsion to take the test, especially for 
an individual who fears the extraction or opposes it on 
religious grounds. If it wishes to compel persons to 
submit to such attempts to discover evidence, the State 
may have to forgo the advantage of any testimonial 
products of administering the test-products which fall 
t.,·, 
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within the privilege." 384 U. S., at 765, and n. 9 (em-
phasis in original). 
Thus, Schmerber resolved the dilemma by allowing admission 
of the nontestimonial, but not the testimonial, products of the 
State's compulsion. · 
The Court has applied this bifurcated approach in its sub-
sequent cases as well. For example, in United States v. 
Wade, where admission of a line-up identification was ap-
proved, the Court emphasized that no question was pre-
sented as to the admissibility of anything said or done at the 
lineup. See 388 U. S. 218, 223 (1967). Likewise, in Michi-
gan v. Tucker, where evidence derived from a technical 
Miranda violation was admitted, the Court noted that no 
statement taken without Miranda warnings was being ad-
mitted into evidence. See 417 U. S., at 445; cf. California v. 
Byers, 402 U. S. 424, 431-433 (1971) (Opinion of BURGER, 
C. J.). Thus, based on the distinction first articulated in 
Schmerber, "a strong analytical argument can be made for an 
intermediate rule whereby[,] although [the police] cannot re-
quire a suspect to speak by punishment or force, the non-tes-
timonial [evidence derived] from speech that is [itself] exclud-
able for failure to comply with the Miranda code could still be 
used." H. Friendly, Benchmarks, p. 280 (1967). · 
To be sure, admission of nontestimonial evidence secured 
through informal custodial interrogation will reduce the in-
centives to enforce the Miranda code. But that fact simply 
begs the question of how much enforcement is appropriate. 
There are some situations, as the Court's struggle to accom-
modate a "public safety" exception demonstrates, in which 
the societal cost of administering the Miranda warnings is 
very high indeed.3 The Miranda decision quite practically 
3 The most obvious example, first suggested by Judge Henry Friendly, 
involves interrogation directed to the discovery and termination of an on-
going criminal activity such as kidnapping or extortion. See Friendly, 
The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929, 
949 (1965). 
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does not express any societal interest in having those warn-
ings administered for their own sake. Rather, the warnings 
and waiver are only required to ensure that "testimony" used 
against the accused at trial is voluntarily given. Therefore, 
if the testimonial aspects of the accused's custodial communi-
cations are suppressed, the failure to administer the Miranda 
warnings should cease to be of concern. Cf. Weatherford v. 
Bursey, 429 U. S. 545 (1977) (where interference with assist-
ance of counsel has no affect on trial, no Sixth Amendment 
violation lies). The harm caused by failure to administer 
Miranda warnings relates only to admission of testimonial 
self-incriminations, · and the suppression of such incrimina-
tions should by itself produce the optimal enforcement of the 
Miranda rule. 
c 
There are, of course, decisions of this Court which suggest 
that the privilege against self-incrimination requires suppres-
sion of not only compelled statements but also of all evidence 
derived therefrom. See, e. g., Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 
449 (1975); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 (1972); 
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34 (1924); Counselman v. 
Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892). In each of these cases, 
however, the Court was responding to the dilemma that con-
fronts persons asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege to 
a court or other tribunal vested with the contempt power. 
In each instance, the tribunal can require witnesses to appear 
without any showing of probable cause to believe they have 
committed an offense or that they have relevant information 
to convey, and require the witnesses to testify even if they 
have formally and expressly asserted a privilege of silence. 
Individuals in this situation are faced with what Justice Gold-
berg once described as "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, 
perjury, or contempt." Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 
378 U. S. 52, 55 (1964). If the witness' invocation of the 
privilege at trial is not to be defeated by the State's refusal to 
let him remain silent at an earlier proceeding, the witness has 
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to be protected "against the use of [his] compelled answers 
and evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal 
case ... . "Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 78 (1973). 
By contrast, suspects subject to informal custodial police 
interrogation of the type involved in this case are not in the 
same position as witnesses required to appear before a court, 
grand jury, or other such formal tribunal. Where independ-
ent evidence leads police to a suspect, and probable cause jus-
tifies his arrest, the suspect cannot seriously urge that the 
police have somehow unfairly infringed on his right "to a pri-
vate enclave where he may lead a private life." Murphy v. 
Waterfront Commission, supra, at 55. Moreover, when a 
suspect interjects not the privilege itself but a post hoc com-
plaint that the police failed to administer Miranda warnings, 
he invokes only an irrebuttable presumption that the interro-
gation was coercive. He does not show that a privilege was 
raised and that the police actually or overtly coerced him to 
provide testimony and other evidence to be used against him 
at trial. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 730 
(1966). He could have remained silent and the interrogator 
could not have punished him for refusing to speak. Indeed, 
the accused is in the unique position of seeking the protection 
of the privilege without having timely asserted it. Cf. 
United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 10 (1970) (failure to as-
sert waives right to complain about testimonial compulsion). 
The person in police custody surely may sense that he is in 
"trouble," Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 722 (1975), but he 
is in no position to protest that he faced the Hobson's choice 
of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt. He therefore has a 
much less sympathetic case for obtaining the benefit of a 
broad suppression ruling. See Michigan v. Tucker, supra, 
at 444-451; cf. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U. S. 450, 458-459 
(1979). 
Indeed, whatever case can be made for suppression evapo-
rates when the statements themselves are not admitted, 
given the rationale of the Schmerber line of cases. Certainly 
·, ~ .... 
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interrogation which provides leads to other evidence does not 
offend the values underlying the Fifth Amendment privilege 
any more than the compulsory taking of blood samples, fin-
gerprints, or voice exemplars, all of which may be compelled 
in an "attempt to discover evidence that might be used to 
prosecute [a defendant] for a criminal offense." Schmerber 
v. California, supra, at 761. Use of a suspect's answers 
"merely to find other evidence establishing his connection 
with the crime [simply] differs by only a shade from the per-
mitted use for that purpose of his body and blood." H. 
Friendly, supra, p. 280. The values underlying the privilege 
may justify exclusion of an unwarned person's out-of-court 
statements, as perhaps they may justify exclusion of state-
ments and derivative evidence compelled under the threat of 
contempt. But when the only evidence to~be admitted is de-
rivative evidence such as a gun-derived not from actual 
compulsion but from a statement taken in the absence of 
Miranda warnings-those values simply cannot require sup-
pression, at least no more so than they would for other such 
nontestimonial evidence. 4 
• In suggesting that Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963), 
requires exclusion of the gun, see post, at 15-16, JusTICE MARSHALL fails 
to acknowledge this Court's holding in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 
445-446 (1974). In Tucker, the Court very clearly held that Wong Sun is J 
inapplicable in cases involving mere departures from Miranda. Wong 
Sun and its "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis lead to exclusion of deriv-
ative evidence only where the underlying police misconduct infringes a 
"core" constitutional right. See id. Failure to administer Miranda warn-
ings violates only a nonconstitutional prophylactic. Ibid. 
Nix v. Williams,-- U. S. -- (1984), is not to the contrary. In Nix, 
the Court held that evidence which inevitably would have been discovered 
need not be excluded at trial because of independent police misconduct. 
The Court in Nix discusses Wong Sun and its "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
analysis only to show that, even assuming a "core" violation of the Fourth, 
Fifth, or Sixth Amendment, evidence with a separate causal link need not 
be excluded at trial. Thus, Nix concludes that only "where 'the subse-
quent trial [cannot] cure a[n otherwise] one-sided confrontation between 
prosecuting authorities and the uncounseled defendant,'" id, at --
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On the other hand, if a suspect is subject to abusive police 
practices and actually or overtly compelled to speak, it is rea-
sonable to infer both an unwillingness to speak and a percep-
tible assertion of the privilege. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 
U. S. 385, 396-402 (1978). Thus, when the Miranda viola-
tion consists of a deliberate and flagrant abuse of the 
accused's constitutional rights, amounting to a denial of due 
process, application of a broader exclusionary rule is war-
ranted. Of course, "a defendant raising [such] a coerced-
confession claim must first prevail in a voluntariness hearing 
before his confession and evidence derived from it [will] be-
come inadmissible." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 
441, 462 (1972). By contrast, where the accused proves only 
that the police failed to administer the Miranda warnings, 
exclusion of the statement itself is all that will and should be 
required. 5 Limitation of the Miranda prohibition to testi-
monial use of the statements themselves adequately serves 
the purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
III 
In Miranda, the Court looked to the experience of coun-
tries like England, India, Scotland, and Ceylon in developing 
its code to regulate custodial interrogations. See Miranda 
v. Arizona, supra, 384 U. S., at 486-489. Those countries 
had also adopted procedural rules to regulate the manner in 
which police secured confessions to be used against accused 
(quoting from United States v. Ash, 413 U. S. 300, 315 (1973)), should de-
rivative evidence be excluded. Cf. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387, 
406--407 and n. 12 (1977) (leaving open question whether any evidence be-
yond the incriminating statements themselves must be excluded); Massiah 
v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 207 (1964) (same). 
6 Respondent has not previously contended that his confession was so 
blatantly coerced as to constitute a violation of due process. He has ar-
gued only that police failed to administer Miranda warnings. He has 
proved, therefore, only that his statement was presumptively compelled. 
In any event, that is a question for the trial court on remand to decide in 
the first instance, not for this Court to decide on certiorari review. 
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persons at trial. See Developments in the Law-Confes-
sions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 1090-1114 (1966). Confessions 
induced by trickery or physical abuse were never admissible 
at trial, and any confession secured without the required pro-
cedural safeguards could, in the courts' discretion, be ex-
cluded on grounds of fairness or prejudice. See Gotlieb, 
Confirmation by Subsequent Facts, 72 L. Q. Rev. 209, 
223-224 (1956). But nontestimonial evidence derived from 
all confessions "not blatantly coerced" was and still is admit-
ted. H. Friendly, supra, p. 282; see also Commissioners of 
Customs and Excise v. Harz, 1 All Eng. Rep. 177, 182 
(1967); The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783). 
Admission of nontestimonial evidence of this type is based on 
the very sensible view that procedural errors should not 
cause entire investigations and prosecutions to be lost. See 
Enker and Elsen, Counsel For the Suspect: M assiah v. 
United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 47, 
80 (1964). 
The learning of these countries was important to develop-
ment of the initial Miranda rule. It therefore should be of 
equal importance in establishing the scope of the Miranda 
exclusionary rule today. 6 I would apply that learning in this 
case and adhere to our precedents requiring that statements 
elicited in the absence of Miranda warnings be suppressed. 
But because nontestimonial evidence such as the gun should 
not be suppressed, I join in that part of the Court's judgment 
that reverses and remands for further proceedings with the 
gun admissible as evidence against the accused. 
6 Interestingly, the trend in these other countries is to admit the im-
properly obtained statements themselves, if nontestimonial evidence later 
corroborates, in whole or in part, the admission. See Development in the 
Law-Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 1094-1095, 1100, 1104, 
1108-1109 (1966); see also The Queen v. Ramasamy, [1965] A. C. 1, 12-15 
(P. C.). 
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